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LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE
PERCEPTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CATCH
SHARES
Mark Fina* & Tyson Kade**
Abstract: Catch shares are a fishery management strategy under which
persons are allocated exclusive access to specific portions of the total allowable
catch of a fishery. Proponents of catch share management argue that these
programs allow for more efficient management of annual catch limits and
mitigate the negative biological and economic impacts associated with other
management programs. Because of the exclusivity of their allocations, catch
share programs have been characterized by their opponents as privatizing the
public fisheries resource and granting catch share holders a property right to
fish. However, case law suggests that a court is unlikely to conclude that catch
shares constitute property or entitle a share holder to compensation under the
Fifth Amendment takings clause if those shares are revoked or modified.
Nevertheless, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act instills catch shares with more attributes of property than other fishing
permits. This paper examines the existing authority for establishing catch share
management programs and the property right implications of that authority.
Despite the low probability that a court would find a compensable taking, an
analysis of takings law provides useful guidance to policymakers and fishery
managers as they attempt to develop catch share programs. Consideration of
takings law can help managers to structure a program that provides some of the
benefits that arise from property rights, while avoiding potential claims of
entitlement from catch share holders when program modifications are
implemented.
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INTRODUCTION

Catch shares are a fishery management strategy under
which individuals, harvesting cooperatives, communities, or
other entities are allocated exclusive access to specific portions
of the total allowable catch of a fishery. 1 Proponents of catch
share management argue that these programs allow for more
efficient management of annual catch limits, mitigate negative
biological and economic impacts associated with the race for
fish that typically arises under limited access management,
and promote safer and more profitable fishing practices. 2
1. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA CATCH SHARE POLICY i, available
at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/docs/noaa_cs_policy.pdf.
2. See generally EVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES (Donald R. Leal
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Because of the exclusivity of allocations, catch share programs
have been characterized by their opponents as privatizing the
public fisheries resource and granting catch share holders a
property right to fish. 3
Since 1990, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NOAA
Fisheries), the federal agency tasked by the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (“MagnusonStevens Act”) with managing the nation’s fisheries, has
implemented seventeen catch share programs. 4 In response to
increased support for the use of catch share management
programs, in 2010, NOAA Fisheries released its Catch Share
Policy, which states:
[T]o achieve long-term ecological and economic
sustainability of the Nation’s fishery resources and
fishing
communities,
NOAA
encourages
the
consideration and adoption of catch shares wherever
appropriate in fishery management and ecosystem
plans and their amendments, and will support the
design, implementation, and monitoring of catch share
programs. 5
Despite the increased support for the development of catch
share programs, 6 program modifications are strongly resisted
ed., 2005) (wherein several economists describe their perspectives on these benefits).
3. Daniel Bromley, Abdicating Responsibility: The Deceits of Fishery Policy, 34
FISHERIES 280, 283–84 (2009); Seth Macinko & Daniel W. Bromley, Property and
Fisheries for the Twenty First Century: Seeking Coherence from Legal and Economic
Doctrine, 28 VT. L. REV. 623, 638–43 (2004).
4. See Catch Shares – Programs by Region, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/catchshare_region.htm
(last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
5. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at 3, 7; “NOAA Fisheries
developed its catch share policy to “encourage well-designed catch share programs to
help maintain or rebuild fisheries, and sustain fishermen, communities and vibrant
working waterfronts, including the cultural and resource access traditions that have
been part of this country since its founding.” Id. at i.
6. See, e.g., KATE BONZON, ET AL., CATCH SHARE DESIGN MANUAL: A GUIDE FOR
MANAGERS AND FISHERMEN (2010), available at
http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/catch-share-design-manual.pdf; THE PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DESIGN MATTERS: MAKING CATCH SHARES WORK (2009),
available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Protecting_ocean_l
ife/CatchShare.pdf?n=5322; NATIONAL PANEL ON THE COMMUNITY DIMENSIONS OF
FISHERIES CATCH SHARE PROGRAMS, COMMUNITY DIMENSIONS OF FISHERIES CATCH
SHARE PROGRAMS: INTEGRATING ECONOMY, EQUITY, AND ENVIRONMENT (2011),
available at
http://www.ecotrust.org/fisheries/NPCDFCSP_paper_031511.pdf (The
strength of the movement toward catch share management is evident as non-
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by share holders who assert a loss of property based on the
concern that their investments may be devalued by
modifications.
While the Magnuson-Stevens Act contains a disclaimer that
catch shares do not confer a compensable property right, 7 the
characterization and implementation of catch share programs
have created the opposite perception among fishermen. For
example, the hallmark of a catch share program is that it
provides a share holder with exclusive access to a specified
amount of catch. 8 Much like traditional property, a fisherman
can typically buy, sell, or lease catch shares thereby adjusting
the amount of fish that the share holder could harvest. While
initially issued for a specified duration, the 2006 MagnusonStevens Act Reauthorization includes a provision for renewal
of catch shares unless those shares are revoked, limited, or
modified under the terms of the program. 9 NOAA Fisheries has
characterized this renewal as creating a “rolling conditional
permanence” of catch shares. 10 In addition, the 2006
Magnuson-Stevens Act Reauthorization allowed the use of
auctions or other royalty programs where fishermen would pay
for an allocation of catch shares. 11 Finally, for certain fisheries,
NOAA Fisheries may provide federal financing, with loan
durations of up to twenty-five or thirty years, to allow
fishermen to purchase catch shares.12
In the event of an amendment or revocation of an
established catch share program, catch share holders may
bring suit against the federal government in an attempt to
recover any lost property value. 13 The Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution provides that “nor shall private

governmental organizations have issued manuals to ensure that their organizations’
objectives are considered in the development of catch share programs.).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b) (Supp. V 2006).
8. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at i.
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(f)(1)-(3) (Supp. V 2006).
10. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., THE DESIGN AND USE OF LIMITED ACCESS
PRIVILEGE PROGRAMS 27 (NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-F/SPO-86) (Lee
Anderson and Mark Holliday eds., 2007), available at
http://spo.nmfs.noaa.gov/tm/tm86.pdf.
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(d) (Supp. V 2006).
12. Id. § 1853a(g) (Supp. V 2006); 50 C.F.R. § 253.27–.30 (2012).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006). (The Tucker Act vests the United States Court of
Federal Claims with exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the United States for a
taking in excess of $10,000).
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property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” 14
To establish a taking of property for Fifth Amendment
purposes, a claimant must first establish a property interest. 15
If such an interest exists, the claimant must establish that the
government action constitutes a compensable taking of that
property interest. 16 If the alleged taking is not categorical,
meaning that the property owner retains some economic
value, 17 the court will determine whether a taking occurred
based upon an examination of the following three factors: (1)
“[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant”; (2)
“the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations”; and (3) “the character of the
governmental action.” 18
Courts have concluded that catch shares are property in
certain contexts, 19 but have not yet addressed this question for
purposes of compensation for a Fifth Amendment taking.
When considering the revocation of other types of fishing
permits, the courts have conclusively held that these permits
are revocable privileges, they are not property, and that the
permit holder is not entitled to any compensation as a result of
changes to the management regime or revocation of the
permit. 20 However, given the nature of catch shares, and the
manner in which catch share programs are established, it
could be argued that catch shares are more akin to property
than the fishing permits that have been subject to Fifth
Amendment analysis to date.
This paper examines the rationale and existing authority for
establishing catch share management programs. It also
summarizes how courts have considered Fifth Amendment
takings claims involving fishing permits, and considers
whether the inclusion of certain measures in catch share
programs could influence a court’s decision of whether catch

14. U.S. CONST., amend. V, cl. 4.
15. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
16. Id.
17. Id. (citations omitted).
18. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1973).
19. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 928 P.2d 597, 599–600 (Alaska 1996) (IFQs are property
in marital dissolution); Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th
Cir. 1998) (IFQ is property for procedural due process).
20. E.g., Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., 379 F.3d at 1379; Conti v. United States, 291
F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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shares are a compensable property right. Given the novelty of
catch share management and the transitions brought on by
their introduction in a fishery, the need for program revisions
should be anticipated. Recognizing that a court is unlikely to
determine that catch shares are property rights for Fifth
Amendment compensation purposes, the paper identifies
considerations for the development of catch share programs
and amendments to those programs, as well as successor
management programs, that could minimize perceptions that
catch shares are property and reduce the potential for permit
holders to seek compensation for investment losses in a catch
share-based fishery management regime. Maintaining
awareness of the considerations that lead share holders to
conclude catch shares are private property (even if a court will
not likely find property rights in catch shares) may treat catch
share holders more equitably by allowing for program
modifications with less disruption to their interests in the
fishery.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Economic Justification for Development of Catch Shares as
a Fishery Management Tool

1.

Economic Issues Associated with Traditional Fisheries
Management

Economists developed the foundations of catch share
management to address perceived shortcomings arising from
an absence of property rights in fisheries. 21 Fisheries are
generally considered a public trust resource. Principles of the
public trust doctrine have guided fishery management for
centuries. 22 Under that doctrine, fisheries resources are held
21. Rögnvaldur Hannesson, The Privatization of Oceans, in EVOLVING PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 2, at 25, 31–37.
22. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SHARING THE FISH: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY
ON INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS 39–45 (1999) (The public trust doctrine dates to
Roman and English common law. Courts have frequently applied the doctrine to state
management of fishery resources, interpreting fish as being public assets to be
managed for the benefit of the public until captured.). See generally Douglas F. Britton,
The Privatization of the American Fishery: Limitations, Recognitions, and the Public
Trust, 3 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 217 (1997) (describing the application of the public
trust doctrine and related common law doctrines that prevent the establishment of
property rights in fish or fishing permits. It should be noted that the public trust
doctrine has not been directly applied by courts to federal waters of the exclusive
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by the government in trust to be managed and regulated for
the public’s benefit. Resources subject to the public trust
doctrine are inalienable and cannot be transferred. The public
may access and use public trust resources subject to
regulations intended to advance the public good. The public
trust doctrine has often been applied to provide fishermen with
open access to fisheries, allowing anyone to take fish. It should
be noted that the public trust doctrine has not been directly
applied by courts to federal waters of the EEZ, which are those
waters between three and 200 nautical miles from the coastal
baseline.
Over time, the absence of regulatory restrictions may result
in overcapitalization, and possibly overexploitation, of the
fishery as individuals perceiving an opportunity to draw
increased benefit from use of the resource increase effort
through deploying more (or more productive) vessels and
fishing gear. A progression of regulatory restrictions may be
applied in an attempt to constrain effort in the fishery to
protect the resource or economic returns. 23 These restrictions
may include defined seasons or other temporal constraints,
restrictions on entry or gear, and limits on total allowable
catch. Despite these restrictions, participants frequently
exploit regulatory gaps in order to increase effort. For example,
vessel length limits may be ineffective in limiting growth of
capacity if vessel owners are permitted to increase vessel width
and engine horsepower.
Economists have observed that, faced with restrictions on
inputs, fishery participants will typically find ways to increase
effort to fully dissipate rents (or scarcity profits) from a
fishery. 24 The phenomenon of rent dissipation arises from
common pool resource management, which allows any person

economic zone (EEZ)). See also Kevin J. Lynch, Application of the Public Trust Doctrine
to Modern Fishery Management Regimes, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 288 (2007).
Federal waters are those waters between three and 200 nautical miles from the coastal
baseline.
23. See Lynch, supra note 22, at 302–3 (Regulation of uses to protect fishery
resources, such as limits on entry, gear type, and seasons, are generally regarded as
consistent with the public trust obligation to manage the resource for the public
benefit.).
24. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 21–25 (Rents are the difference
between revenues and costs of production (including normal profits or returns to
capital). In natural resource markets, extraordinary profits or rents may be available
because of the scarcity of the resource.).
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to derive a benefit from use of the resource. Rather than invest
in a manner that derives maximum total profits from the
resource, each person will invest to derive maximum individual
profits, given the behavior of others. Participants typically
invest to secure a greater share of the total resource, instead of
producing a defined share of the resource at the least cost.
These expenditures to increase one’s share of the fishery will
dissipate profits from the resource. 25
2.

Economic Rationale for Use of Catch Shares

Economists, influenced in large part by the dissipation of
rents from fisheries under existing management regimes,
began to advocate for the development of harvest privileges
bearing some characteristics of private property rights, such as
individual fishing quotas or individual transferable
quotas, 26 now more commonly known as catch shares. 27 Under
a catch share management program, participants are allocated
an exclusive portion of the annual total allowable catch. 28
These catch share allocations are intended to align each
participant’s individual profits and the total profits from the
fishery. 29 Since a person’s allocation provides access to a
specific amount of fish (regardless of the catches of others), the
catch share holder will deploy fishing effort to realize the
25. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 10, at 5–9; James E. Wilen, Property
Rights and the Texture of Rents in Fisheries, in EVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 2, at 53–55, 64.
26. Over time, a variety of terms have been used to describe systems that are now
collectively referred to as “catch shares,” including individual fishing quotas (IFQs),
individual transferable quotas (ITQs), dedicated access privileges (DAPs), and limited
access privileges (LAPs). This paper refers to these specific terms, when applied by
managers to describe a particular program, but otherwise uses the generic, all
encompassing, term “catch shares.” Where relevant, differences in the terms are
described.
27. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 10, at 5–6. See generally H. Scott
Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL.
ECON. 124 (1954) (thought to be the origin of catch shares and other individual fishing
quotas), and Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL.
ECON. 116 (1955). On economists’ evaluation of catch shares, see, e.g,. EVOLVING
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 2; James L. Anderson, Property
Rights, Fisheries, Aquaculture, and the Future, in EVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 2, at 239–57 (asserting that fisheries will need to
develop catch shares (or property rights) to remain competitive with aquaculture and
other catch share fisheries).
28. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 1, at i.
29. Although an allocation is not exclusive with respect to specific fish, the allocation
provides an exclusive share of the permitted catch.
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greatest gain from those fish, rather than deploying effort to
secure a greater share of the fishery. 30
Under these conditions, the individual catch share holder’s
choices should also maximize profits from the fishery overall.
Arguably, imbuing catch share allocations with more
characteristics of property rights should increase the degree of
alignment between individual profits and total profits from a
fishery. For example, allowing free divisibility and transfer of
shares would allow shares of less efficient harvesters to be
acquired by more efficient harvesters, with both participants
increasing returns along with an increase in total returns from
the fishery. In addition, increasing the tenure of shares—for
example, by making allocations permanent rather than for a
term of years—could increase stewardship in the resource by
share holders, who will perceive a future benefit from stock
conservation efforts. 31
B.

Magnuson-Stevens Act Catch Share Authority

1.

History of Catch Shares under the Magnuson-Stevens Act

Under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, management authority
over federal fisheries is vested in eight regional Councils and
the Secretary of Commerce. 32 The Councils are comprised of
representatives from each state in the Council’s region, and a
state fishery management official from each constituent
state. 33 The primary responsibility of each Council is to develop
fishery management plans (FMP) governing the regional
fisheries consistent with conservation and management
standards established by the Magnuson-Stevens Act. 34 These
national standards include: “prevent[ing] overfishing while

30. Hannesson, supra note 21, at 34. Wilen, supra note 25, at 53–55.
31. See generally R. Quentin Grafton et al., Incentive-Based Approaches to
Sustainable Fisheries, 63 CAN. J. FISHERIES & AQUAT. SCI. 699 (2006) (Collective
actions of catch share holders to influence managers to take actions to protect stocks
are cited as evidence of this stewardship effect.).
32. Pub. L. No. 104-297 (1996) (Sustainable Fisheries Act amending and
reauthorizing the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976). Pub.
L. No. 109-479 (2006) (Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Reauthorization Act). 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2006) (explaining the purpose of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)–(b) (Supp. V 2006).
34. Id. § 1852(h)(1).
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achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each
fishery”; “consider[ing] efficiency in the utilization of fishery
resources”; and “minimiz[ing] bycatch and . . . the mortality
of such bycatch.” 35
As initially adopted, the Magnuson-Stevens Act did not
expressly authorize catch shares. Instead, authority for catch
share management was found in the Act’s authorization of
limited access programs. Specifically, the Act provided regional
Councils and the Secretary of Commerce with the authority to
create “systems to limit access to [a] fishery” provided those
systems:
take into account –
(A) present participation in the fishery;
(B) historical fishing practices in, and dependence on,
the fishery;
(C) the economics of the fishery;
(D) the capability of fishing vessels used in the fishery
to engage in other fisheries;
(E) the cultural and social framework relevant to the
fishery and any affected fishing communities;
(F) the fair and equitable distribution of access
privileges in the fishery; and
(G) any other relevant considerations[.] 36
The 1975 Senate Commerce Committee Report, prepared in
conjunction with the initial Magnuson-Stevens Act, identified
three management measures to limit access to a fishery. 37
First, a limit on the number of vessels, fishermen, or inputs
could be established. Second, a fee or tax on participation could
be used to deter entry beyond the desired participation level.
Third, the total allowable catch could be divided into “shares or
quotas” which are then distributed to participants. This third
suggested measure is effectively a catch share. 38 No specific
35. Id. § 1851(a).
36. Id. § 1853(b)(6).
37. S. REP. NO. 94-416 (1975), reprinted in STAFF OF SENATE COMMISSION ON
COMMERCE AND NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY STUDY, 94TH CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, 653, 691–92 (Comm.
Print 1976).
38. Senator Ted Stevens, however, asserted in the discussion of the Sustainable
Fisheries Act in 1995 that “IFQ’s [sic] are a new tool that we did not even consider in
1990, the last time we reauthorized the Magnuson Act. They were not even dreamed of
when we first passed the Magnuson Act.” 142 CONG. REC. S10810 (daily ed. Sept. 18,
1996).
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reference was made to the nature of the privilege created by
any limited access permit (or the revocability of any such
permit) in the initial version of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
Between 1988 and 1992, three Councils relied upon the
general authority to limit access to fisheries to develop catch
share programs. 39 In 1988, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery
Management Council developed the first IFQ system to
manage the Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery. 40 In
1991, the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council
developed an IFQ system for the wreckfish fishery. 41 In 1992,
the North Pacific Fishery Management Council developed an
IFQ program for the halibut and sablefish fisheries. 42 For each
of these actions, the Councils identified their general authority
to limit access to the fishery as providing the authority to
develop a catch share program.
Following development of these programs (and the
controversies surrounding their implementation), in 1996
Congress adopted specific requirements for the development of
IFQ programs in the Sustainable Fisheries Act. 43 Congress
defined an “individual fishing quota” as “a Federal permit
under a limited access system to harvest a quantity of fish,
expressed by a unit or units representing a percentage of the
total allowable catch of a fishery that may be received or held
for exclusive use by a person . . .” 44 To quell the immediate
controversy, the Sustainable Fisheries Act contained a
moratorium on the submission and implementation of IFQ

39. For a comprehensive discussion of the authority for IFQs under the MagnusonStevens Act prior to its most recent reauthorization, see George J. Mannina, Jr., Is
There a Legal and Conservation Basis for Individual Fishing Quotas? 3 OCEAN &
COASTAL L.J. 5 (1997).
40. MID-ATLANTIC FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, AMENDMENT #8, FISHERY
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE ATLANTIC SURF CLAM AND OCEAN QUAHOG FISHERY 54
(1990).
41. SOUTH ATLANTIC FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, AMENDMENT 5 (WRECKFISH),
REGULATORY IMPACT REVIEW, INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY DETERMINATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE
SNAPPER-GROUPER FISHERY OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC REGION 18 (1991).
42. Final Rule for Halibut and Sablefish IFQ Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 59,375, 59,379–
81 (Nov. 9, 1993).
43. See 142 CONG. REC. S10,810–18 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1996) for an extensive
discussion of the controversy by Senators Ted Stevens, John Kerry, Patty Murray, and
Slade Gorton.
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(23) (Supp. V 2006).
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programs until October 1, 2000. 45 The Sustainable Fisheries
Act also clarified Congressional intent that permits (including
both limited access permits and IFQs) are privileges, revocable
without compensation to the holder. The act provides:
(2)(A) No provision of law shall be construed to limit the
authority of a Council to submit and the Secretary to
approve the termination or limitation, without
compensation to holders of any limited access system
permits, of a fishery management plan, plan
amendment, or regulation that provides for a limited
access system, including an individual fishing quota
program. 46
and
(3) An individual fishing quota or other limited access
system authorization—
(A) shall be considered a permit for purposes of
sections 1857, 1858, and 1859 of this title;
(B) may be revoked or limited at any time in
accordance with this chapter;
(C) shall not confer any right of compensation to the
holder of such individual fishing quota or other
such limited access system authorization if it is
revoked or limited; and
(D) shall not create, or be construed to create, any
right, title, or interest in or to any fish before the
fish is harvested. 47
In addition, Congress commissioned the National Academy
of Sciences to prepare a report on IFQs and directed the
Secretary to use the report to develop a national policy on
IFQs. 48 The report was to address “all aspects of such quotas”
including transferability, limits on foreign control of IFQs,
limits on duration of IFQ programs, and measures to minimize
adverse effects on fishing communities. 49
While the Sustainable Fisheries Act may have codified
Congressional intent that IFQs are a fishing privilege,
revocable without compensation, other aspects of that Act
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(d)(1)(A) (1994), repealed by Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006, § 106, Pub. L. No. 109479, 120 Stat. 3586 (Jan. 12, 2007).
46. Id. § 1853(d)(2)(A).
47. Id. § 1853(d)(3).
48. Sustainable Fisheries Act, §108(f), Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3577 (Oct. 11,
1996).
49. Id.
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furthered the ambiguity concerning the nature of the privilege
created by IFQs (and the extent to which policymakers
intended to induce interested parties to treat IFQs as if they
are property rights). First, the Sustainable Fisheries Act
directed the Secretary to establish an “exclusive central
registry
system . . . for
limited
access
system
permits . . . including individual fishing quotas” for the
“registration of title to, and interests in, such permits.”50 Such
a lien registry is typically intended to secure and prioritize
liens and other interests applied to private property interests.
Second, the Sustainable Fisheries Act authorized Councils to
develop loan programs to support the purchase of IFQs by
small boat fishermen and first time purchasers of IFQs. 51
These federally funded loans effectively induce purchase of
shares by persons wishing to enter or expand their interests in
IFQ fisheries. Although neither of these provisions directly
conflict with Congress’s intent that IFQs create no
compensable property right, both provisions promote IFQs as
transferable fishing privileges that may be acquired through
long-term,
secure
financing
arrangements,
typically
characteristic of property interests.
In October of 2002, after a two-year extension, the
moratorium expired. 52 After repeated efforts to revise the
50. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(h)(1) (1994).
51. Id. § 1853(d)(4)(A), repealed by Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Reauthorization Act of 2006, § 106, Pub. L. No. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3586
(Jan. 12, 2007), recodified at 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(g) (Supp. V 2006). In addition, the Act
directed the North Pacific Fishery Management Council to recommend to the
Secretary a loan program for the financing of halibut and sablefish IFQs. Sustainable
Fisheries Act, §108(g), Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3579 (Oct. 11, 1996).
52. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Appendix D § 144(a), Pub. L. No. 106554, 114 Stat. 2763A-238 (Dec. 21, 2000). Despite its moratorium on IFQs, Congress
continued to authorize the development of catch share programs for certain fisheries
through specific legislation. In 1998, the American Fisheries Act established a
“cooperative program” for the Bering Sea Pollock fishery. American Fisheries Act, §§
205-211, enacted as part of Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-616 (Oct. 20, 1998). In
addition, as a part of the legislation extending the IFQ moratorium, Congress directed
the North Pacific Fishery Management Council to examine catch share management
for the Gulf of Alaska groundfish fisheries and the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands
crab fisheries. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Appendix D § 144(b), Pub. L.
No.106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A-238 (Dec. 21, 2000). After the North Pacific Fishery
Management Council developed the required catch share program for the Bering Sea
and Aleutian Islands crab fisheries, Congress mandated its implementation.
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, § 801, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 108
(Jan. 23, 2004) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1862(j) (Supp. V 2006)).
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Magnuson-Stevens Act provisions authorizing catch share
programs, 53 Congress included revisions of that authority as a
part of the 2006 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
Management Reauthorization Act. 54 These provisions define
the current authority for establishing catch share systems.
C.

Current Catch Share Authority under the MagnusonStevens Act

The 2006 reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act
made substantial changes to the authority of Councils and the
Secretary of Commerce to develop and implement catch share
programs. 55 The reauthorization maintains the clear
statement, codified by the Sustainable Fisheries Act, that
catch shares are a privilege subject to revocation without
compensation. 56 Specifically, in its current form, the
Magnuson-Stevens Act provides that catch shares (or limited
access privileges, as they are defined by that Act):57
53. See, e.g., IFQ Act of 2001, S. 637, 107th Cong. (2001); Fishing Quota Act of 2003,
S. 1106, 108th Cong. (2003).
54. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation Management Reauthorization Act, §
106, Pub. L. No. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3586 (Jan. 12, 2007).
55. Id. (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1853a (Supp. V 2006)). The Act adopted the defined
term “limited access privileges” (LAPs) to include a broader range of holders of catch
shares than the traditional holders of IFQs. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(26) (Supp. V 2006).
Although the wording of the definition is unchanged, the change in terms is intended
to emphasize the introduction of two new types of catch share holders: regional fishing
associations, which may hold LAPs for the benefit of regional interests, and fishing
communities, which may hold LAPs for the benefit of a community. See S. REP. NO.
109-229, at 8 (2006).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b) (Supp. V 2006). In addition, the Report of the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation states that:
NO CREATION OF RIGHT, TITLE, OR INTEREST.—The new section 303A(b)
would re-affirm existing law relating to IFQs that a LAPP is a permit that may be
revoked or limited at any time without right to compensation. This permit would
be considered a grant of permission to participate in the fishery and, as such,
would not grant the holder any right to a fish before it was harvested. As a permit,
the privilege could also be revoked or modified for any failure to comply with the
program or if the system is found to have jeopardized the sustainability of the
stock or the safety of fishermen.
S. REP. NO. 109-229, at 26 (2006).
57. The Magnuson-Stevens Act uses different terminology for catch shares, defining
a “limited access privilege” as a:
Federal permit . . . to harvest a quantity of fish expressed by a unit or units
representing a portion of the total allowable catch of the fishery that may be
received or held for exclusive use by a person . . . .
16 U.S.C. §1802(26) (Supp. V 2006), while NOAA Fisheries states that:
Catch share is a general term for several fishery management strategies that
allocate a specific portion of the total allowable fishery catch to individuals,
cooperatives, communities, or other entities. Each recipient of a catch share is
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(1) shall be considered a permit for the purposes of
sections 1857, 1858, and 1859 of this title;
(2) may be revoked, limited, or modified at any time in
accordance with this chapter, including revocation if
the system is found to have jeopardized the
sustainability of the stock or the safety of fishermen;
(3) shall not confer any right of compensation to the
holder of such limited access privilege, quota share,
or other such limited access system authorization if
it is revoked, limited, or modified;
(4) shall not create, or be construed to create, any right,
title, or interest in or to any fish before the fish is
harvested by the holder; and
(5) shall be considered a grant of permission to the
holder of the limited access privilege or quota share
to engage in activities permitted by such limited
access privilege or quota share. 58
However, the reauthorization contained several other
provisions that are likely to reinforce contentions of catch
share holders that any revocation of catch shares would
unfairly deprive them of an interest in those shares. These
provisions are intended to induce reliance by establishing an
expectation that the privilege will be continued without
revocation.
Under the reauthorization, when developing a catch share
program, a Council must establish policies and procedures
regarding the allocation and acquisition of shares. 59 As part of
this development, the Council must “establish a policy and
criteria for the transferability of limited access privileges
(through sale or lease), that is consistent with the policies

directly accountable to stop fishing when its exclusive allocation is reached. The
term includes specific programs defined in law such as ‘limited access privilege’
(LAP) and ‘individual fishing quota’ (IFQ) programs . . . .
NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA CATCH SHARE POLICY 1 (Nov. 4,
2010). The definition goes on to include territorial use rights fisheries (TURFs), under
which a person has an exclusive privilege to fish in a certain geographical area. Id. The
inclusion of TURFs in the definition seems appropriate only in cases where the
exclusive geographic privilege is accompanied by an exclusive privilege to a specific
quantity of fish (or a total allowable catch is defined for the applicable geographic
area). This paper only intends to address catch shares defining an exclusive privilege
to harvest a certain quantity of fish.
58. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b) (Supp. V 2006).
59. Id. § 1853a(c)(5).
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adopted by the Council for the [allocation of shares].” 60
Although a Council could prohibit the transfer of catch shares
pursuant to this provision, it is also clear that a Council could
allow unfettered transferability, provided that the policy is
consistent with the applicable allocation criteria. Notably, the
statute specifically authorizes the transfer of catch shares by
sale or lease. This authorization of compensated transfers
bolsters arguments that shares are “owned” by their holders.
The Magnuson-Stevens Act reauthorization requires
Councils to consider the use of auctions or other programs to
collect royalties for the distribution of initial or subsequent
allocations. 61 Auction revenues are to be deposited in a fund for
management of the lien registry and the fishery from which
the royalties were collected. 62 If a Council establishes a royalty
collection program, it will likely prompt arguments that the
catch shares are purchased privileges and, as such, should not
be revocable absent a refund of any previously paid royalty
fees. 63 In addition, if auction revenues are used for
management of the fisheries, catch share holders could argue
unjust enrichment if their shares are revoked and
redistributed to others.
The Magnuson-Stevens Act reauthorization limits the
duration of any catch share permits issued under new catch
share programs, but also mandates that permits be reissued
under certain conditions. A catch share permit established
after January 12, 2007, the date of the Magnuson-Stevens Act
reauthorization, is issued for a period of not more than ten
years, but “will be renewed before the end of that period,
unless it has been revoked, limited, or modified.” 64 Congress
provided that a catch share permit can only be rejected,
limited, or modified if the holder fails to comply with certain
identified terms of the applicable FMP or commits an act
prohibited by section 307 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. 65
Establishing a maximum ten-year duration for catch share
60. Id. § 1853a(c)(7)(A).
61. Id. § 1853a(d).
62. Id. § 1855(h)(5).
63. A less compelling argument could be advanced based on cost recovery payments
required to cover government management, data collection and analysis, and
enforcement costs associated with a program. Id. § 1853a(e).
64. Id. § 1853a(f)(1).
65. Id. § 1853a(f)(2)–(3). Section 307 contains general prohibitions, such as a
prohibitions on fishing in violation a permit or after revocation of a permit. Id. § 1857.
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permits might strengthen arguments that these permits are
not issued in perpetuity and that the holder should have no
expectation of permanence beyond the term of the share.
However, defining conditions which, if satisfied, will result in
the renewal of the permit is clearly intended to create an
expectation that the permit will be renewed. NOAA Fisheries
has acknowledged this interpretation by characterizing the
renewal system as establishing a “rolling conditional
permanence” of catch shares. 66
The Magnuson-Stevens Act reauthorization maintained the
loan authority originally established under the Sustainable
Fisheries Act. 67 Pursuant to this authority, NOAA Fisheries,
through its Fisheries Finance Program, may provide federal
financing to participants in the Alaska halibut, sablefish, and
crab fisheries and to certain Alaska community groups to
enable the purchase of catch shares. 68 NOAA Fisheries has
limited the duration of such loans to twenty-five years for
fishermen and thirty years for community groups. 69 In
practice, loans of twenty-five years are not uncommon. 70 Given
the nature of the catch share asset, purchasers typically rely
on returns from catch to fund their loan payments. Purchasers
are likely to interpret the issuance of these relatively long-term
loans by the same agency that issues the catch shares as a
reflection of the long-term nature of the catch shares they are
acquiring. The long-term loans clearly reinforce any
impression that catch shares have a degree of permanence at
least as long as the term of the loan.
D.

Controversy Associated with Use of Catch Shares

While the momentum for development of catch share
programs is surging, a vocal opposition has also grown. Much
of the opposition focuses on the distributional effects of the
programs. Stakeholders left out of the initial allocation of
shares assert that they are disenfranchised by the

66. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 10.
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(g) (Supp. V 2006).
68. 50 C.F.R. § 253.27–.30 (2012).
69. Id.
70. Interview with Earl Bennett, Financial Services Division, NOAA Fisheries, in
Silver Spring, MD (March 27, 2012).
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programs. 71 Fish processors assert that negotiating leverage
shifts to vessel owners, devaluing their stake in the fisheries. 72
Some critics claim that catch shares lead to the redistribution
of fishing interests from traditional fishermen to corporate
investors. This shift purportedly undermines small fishing
communities through redistribution of share holdings, which is
compounded by the concentration of landings in more efficient,
larger ports. 73 Crewmembers also claim to be harmed by
declines in crew employment with the consolidation of catch on
fewer vessels and reduced pay associated with this shift in
employment. 74
Throughout the debate over the merits of catch share
management, supporters frequently describe catch shares as
private property rights. 75 These proponents contend that the
benefits derived from catch shares arise primarily from their
property right characteristics. 76 A variety of factors are
typically cited as indicia of property rights. Generally, a
property right is legally characterized by the right to possess,
use, and dispose of a thing. 77 These characteristics may be
71. Evelyn Pinkerton & Danielle N. Edwards, The Elephant in the Room: The
Hidden Costs of Leasing Individual Transferable Quotas, 33 MARINE POL’Y 707, 708–9
(2009).
72. See SCOTT C. MATULICH & MICHAEL CLARK, ALASKA DEP’T OF FISH AND GAME &
WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY, EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY CHOICES IN FISHERY
RATIONALIZATION POLICY DESIGN: AN EXAMINATION OF THE NORTH PACIFIC HALIBUT
AND SABLEFISH IFQ POLICY IMPACTS ON PROCESSORS (2002).
73. Pinkerton & Edwards, supra note 71, at 710–12; ECOTRUST & ECOTRUST
CANADA, CATCH-22: CONVERSATION, COMMUNITIES, AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF B.C.
FISHERIES: AN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL IMPACT STUDY (2004); SETH
MACINKO & WILLIAM WHITMORE, A NEW ENGLAND DILEMMA: THINKING SECTORS
THROUGH, FINAL REPORT TO MASSACHUSETTS DIVISION OF MARINE FISHERIES 52–54
(2009).
74. Pinkerton & Edwards, supra note 71, at 711.
75. Even federal regulators periodically refer to catch shares as property rights. See,
e.g., Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Ocean Quahog (Arctica islandica), FISH WATCH—
U.S. SEAFOOD FACTS,
http://www.fishwatch.gov/seafood_profiles/species/clams/species_pages/ocean_quahog_c
lam.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2012) (“[The ITQ] system[ is] an innovative “catch share”
program that allocates shares of the annual harvest to individual fishermen or
vessels.”). References to “property rights” in fisheries appear throughout EVOLVING
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 2.
76. See EVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 2; NAT’L
MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 10; Katrina M. Wyman, The Property Rights
Challenge in Marine Fisheries, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 544–46 (2008).
77. See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property §§1, 3 (2009); 73 C.J.S. Property §1–2 (2012).
Economists Anderson and Holliday suggest that critical characteristics for establishing
a property right are a) exclusivity, b) permanence, c) security of title or interest, and d)
transferability. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 10.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol2/iss2/3

18

Fina and Kade: Legal and Policy Implications of the Perception of Property Right

2012]

PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CATCH SHARES

301

present, to varying degrees, in a catch share program. By
definition, catch shares provide the holder with an exclusive
privilege to harvest a quantity of fish. Some programs permit
transfers. In some cases, shares may be subject to the
encumbrances of liens. The presence of these characteristics is
cited by proponents as evidence that catch shares establish a
property right. 78
While some proponents refer to catch shares as creating a
property right, this liberal use of terminology has drawn the
ire of critics of catch share management. These critics
consistently refer to both the public trust and related common
law doctrines, as well as statutory language, to support an
argument that catch shares are not private property rights,
but are only harvest privileges.79
Case law generally supports the proposition that federally
issued fishing permits are not property rights. As such, courts
have held that these permits may be revoked without
compensation. 80
While these cases appear to have settled issues related to
whether fishing permits constitute property that is subject to
protection under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, no court has considered
whether a catch share permit is a property right subject to the
takings clause. 81 In addition, the facts and merits of prior
permit cases may differ from potential future claims alleging
that revocation of a catch share permit constitutes a

78. Throughout EVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES, supra note 2,
authors refer to catch share programs as creating “property rights.” See also USE OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FISHRIGHTS99
CONFERENCE (TECHNICAL PAPER 404/2) (Ross Shotton ed., 2000), available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/X8985E/X8985E00.HTM (in which several authors refer
to catch share programs as “creating property rights”).
79. Bromley, supra note 3, at 283–84 (2009); Macinko & Bromley, supra note 3, at
638–43.
80. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1379–81 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
81. In other contexts, courts have determined that an IFQ permit is property. E.g.,
Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998) (“There can be
no doubt that the IFQ permit is property. It is subject to sale, transfer, lease,
inheritance, and division as marital property in a dissolution.”). However, the court’s
examination in Foss was limited to whether there is a constitutionally protectable
property interest in acquiring an IFQ permit under the Due Process Clause. The court
distinguished the claims at issue from those relating to ownership of the fish, which it
dismissed as “pure fantasy.” Id.
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deprivation of property. Catch share programs are defined by
the Councils and the Secretary of Commerce under the
authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. 82 That authority
provides substantial discretion to the Councils and the
Secretary in shaping catch share programs to the needs of the
applicable fishery. Recent revisions to the Magnuson-Stevens
Act authorizing (and in some cases requiring) the Secretary of
Commerce and Councils to incorporate certain measures into
catch share management programs can be argued to have
shifted these privileges closer to a property interest subject to
the protection of the Fifth Amendment takings clause.
III. FISHERIES AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
Catch shares are frequently characterized as providing the
holder with a property right in the relevant fishery. From a
legal perspective, this statement is overly simplistic and may
create a perception that the catch share holder possesses more
than what is legally recognized. Given that catch shares are
frequently bought, sold, and leased for significant amounts of
money, and support the purchase of fishing vessels and gear, it
is necessary to examine which rights a catch share holder may
possess. It is then necessary to look at whether such catch
shares would entitle the holder to any compensation should the
regulatory program be amended or terminated, thereby
extinguishing the holder’s shares. This section provides an
overview of the law regarding the taking of property rights and
how courts have considered claims for compensation based on
taken fishing permits.
A.

Overview of Fifth Amendment Taking Law

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states, in pertinent part, that “nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”83 The courts
have recognized that this clause prohibits the “[g]overnment
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.” 84 While it is readily apparent that a formal
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a) (Supp. V 2006).
83. U.S. CONST., amend. V, cl. 4.
84. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1973) (citing
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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appropriation or physical occupation of private property by the
government may constitute a taking, the Supreme Court has
recognized that a taking can occur “if regulation goes too far.” 85
As the Court has stated, a regulatory taking may occur when
government action, although not encroaching upon or
occupying private property, “still affect[s] and limits its use to
such an extent that a taking occurs.” 86 While a vessel could
conceivably be subject to appropriation or physical occupation,
for purposes of this discussion, we are primarily focused on
whether a government regulatory action affecting a catch
share (including the revocation of a catch share) could
effectuate a taking.
In the regulatory taking context, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit 87 has established a two-part test to
determine whether government regulation constitutes a taking
of private property without the payment of just
compensation. 88 The court as a threshold matter, must first
“determine whether the claimant has established a ‘property
interest’” that has been impacted by government action. 89 In
doing so, courts are frequently forced to sort through various
claimed interests to determine which may qualify as
compensable property under the Fifth Amendment. For
example, a fisherman may assert a right to a certain amount of
fish, a right to a fishing permit, or a right to use a vessel to
fish. If the court determines that the claimant failed to
establish a legally cognizable property interest, the court will
dismiss the case. 90
Second, assuming that a property interest exists, the court
will determine whether the governmental action constituted a
compensable taking of that property interest. 91 As part of this
determination, the court will examine whether the taking was
85. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“[W]hile property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.”).
86. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).
87. The Tucker Act vests the United States Court of Federal Claims with exclusive
jurisdiction over claims against the United States for a taking in excess of $10,000. 28
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2006).
88. Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
89. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
90. Id. at 1372 (“[I]t is axiomatic that only persons with a valid property interest at
the time of the taking are entitled to compensation.”) (citation omitted).
91. Id.
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categorical or not. In explaining the difference between a
categorical and noncategorical taking, the Federal Circuit has
stated:
A categorical taking has been defined as one in which
“all economically viable use, i.e., all economic value, has
been taken by the regulatory imposition.” A categorical
taking is distinct from a taking “that is the consequence
of a regulatory imposition that prohibits or restricts
only some of the uses that would otherwise be available
to the property owner, but leaves the owner with
substantial viable economic use.” 92
The Supreme Court has stated that a categorical taking
involves the “total deprivation of beneficial use.” 93 As such, a
property owner must demonstrate that it was forced to
“sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the
common good, that is, to leave his property economically
idle.” 94
In considering a categorical taking, the nature of the
property interest may be relevant to a court’s determination of
whether a taking has occurred. In Members of the Peanut
Quota Holders Ass’n v. United States, 95 a court found a
property interest in government created peanut quotas, but
found that revocation of those quotas did not entitle the owner
to compensation. The court based its finding on the fact that
the quotas were wholly a creation of the government and that
“unless the statute itself or surrounding circumstances
indicate that such conveyances are intended to be irrevocable,
the government does not forfeit the right to withdraw those
benefits or qualify them as it chooses.” 96
If a categorical taking did not occur, the court will determine
if the governmental action constituted a non-categorical
regulatory taking based on an examination of the three factors
identified in Penn Central Transportation Company v. New

92. Id. (citations omitted).
93. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992).
94. Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original).
95. 421 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
96. Id. at 1335. The court’s decision creates some uncertainty as to whether the case
is one of a categorical or non-categorical taking, as its rationale for the decision cites
Penn Central, which established the test for determining a non-categorical taking. The
contested government action, however, was a revocation of quotas, which deprived
holders of their quotas in their entirety.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol2/iss2/3

22

Fina and Kade: Legal and Policy Implications of the Perception of Property Right

2012]

PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CATCH SHARES

305

York City. 97 Those three factors are: (1) “[t]he economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant”; (2) “the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations”; and (3) “the character of the governmental
action.” 98
Under the first factor, the economic impacts of the action, a
court will assess the degree to which a regulation interferes
with the claimant’s property interest. To do so, the court will
“compare the value that has been taken from the property with
the value that remains in the property.” 99 While there is no
definitive test for how much impact must occur to constitute a
taking, the courts have suggested that the loss must be
substantial. 100 Recently, the Supreme Court stated that the
goal of the Penn Central test is to “identify regulatory actions
that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which
government directly appropriates private property or ousts the
owner from his domain.” 101 By characterizing a regulatory
taking in this manner, the Court identified the magnitude of
the economic loss that must occur. Accordingly, to succeed on a
taking claim, the claimant must establish that the regulatory
action rendered the subject property essentially valueless. 102
Under the second factor, interference with investmentbacked expectations, the court will examine the reliance of the
claimant on the pre-existing regulatory regime. The Federal
Circuit will consider three factors when determining the
reasonableness of a party’s expectations:
(1) whether the plaintiff operated in a highly regulated
industry; (2) whether the plaintiff was aware of the
problem that spawned the regulation at the time it
purchased the allegedly taken property; and (3)
whether the plaintiff could have reasonably anticipated
the possibility of such regulation in light of the

97. 438 U.S. 103 (1978).
98. Id. at 124.
99. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987).
100. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“Government could
hardly go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law.”).
101. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
102. While lower values may support a taking, courts have generally found a taking
to occur when value losses are “well in excess of 85 percent.” Brace v. United States, 72
Fed. Cl. 337, 357 (2006).
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regulatory environment at the time of purchase. 103
To ensure reasonableness, courts have stated that there
“must be more than a unilateral expectation or an abstract
need.” 104 Further, in considering the nature of the regulation,
courts have distinguished between “legislation that merely
clarified the originally-intended meaning of an existing
statute” and “legislative amendments that fundamentally
changed the scheme legislated previously.” 105
Under the third factor, the character of the government
action, the court will examine the purpose and importance of
the public interest associated with the regulatory action.106 The
Supreme Court has stated that “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily
be found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . than
when interference arises from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.” 107 The Court has recognized that individuals
may be burdened by government actions as part of the benefit
of living and conducting business in a civilized
society. 108 However, some government action is “so substantial
and unforeseeable . . . that justice and fairness require that [it]
be borne by the public as a whole.” 109
B.

There is no Property Interest in Wild Fish, Generic Fishing
Permits, or the Use of a Vessel or Gear

As discussed previously, a court will conduct a two-part
analysis to determine if a taking has occurred. First, the court
will examine whether a property interest exists in the asset at
issue. Second, if a property right exists, the court will examine
whether the governmental action constituted a compensable
taking of that property interest.
As an initial inquiry, it is necessary to determine what
property a claimant may allege will be taken should NOAA
103. Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted).
104. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (citation omitted).
105. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(emphasis in original).
106. Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
107. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1973).
108. Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984).
109. Id. (citations omitted).
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Fisheries revoke the claimant’s fishing permit or modify the
governing management regime. In many instances, to
participate in a commercial fishery, a fisherman must make
large capital investments in the necessary gear and vessel and
obtain the required permits before pursuing the target catch
species. For purposes of the takings analysis, all three
elements—fish, permits, and vessel/gear—could be considered
property subject to compensation. As discussed below, the
courts have considered whether a claimant has a property
interest in all three components.
When considering whether a property interest exists, for
purposes of a Fifth Amendment takings claim, the Federal
Circuit has stated that “[t]he Constitution neither creates nor
defines the scope of property interests compensable under the
Fifth Amendment.” 110 Instead, whether a property interest
exists is determined by the law that creates the interest and by
“‘existing rules and understandings’ and ‘background
principles’ derived from independent sources, such as state,
federal, or common law.” 111 In summarizing the existing law
the Federal Circuit stated that a “compensable interest is
indicated by the absence of express statutory language
precluding the formation of a property right in combination
with the presence of the right to transfer and the right to
exclude.” 112 To satisfy a court’s inquiry, the claimant must
show more than an abstract need, desire, or unilateral
expectation of a particular benefit, the claimant must “have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” 113
1.

There is no Property Interest in Wild Fish

It is well established that a fishermen does not have a
property interest in fish until the fish have actually been
caught. This principle dates back to the nineteenth century
case of Pierson v. Post, which concluded that a property right
110. Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1340–42 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
111. Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323,
1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) and Maritrans Inc.,
342 F.3d at 1352)). As such, the typical analysis examines the relationship between the
claimant and the alleged property, and considers whether the claimant has the right to
exclude, use, transfer, or dispose of the property. Id.
112. Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n, 421 F.3d at 1331.
113. Id. at 1330.
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in wild animals can only be acquired through possession. 114
Subsequent courts have dismissed the notion that a fisherman
has a property right to fish prior to their capture. For example,
the Supreme Court has stated that it is “pure fantasy to talk of
‘owning’ wild fish, birds, or animals.” 115 In expounding upon
this statement, the Court stated that “[n]either the States nor
the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman
or hunter, has title to these creatures until they are reduced to
possession by skillful capture.” 116 Accordingly, the courts have
readily distinguished between a property right in fishing
permits and in the fish themselves. 117 Regarding the latter,
until the fish are actually captured and possessed, a fisherman
is unlikely to succeed on a taking claim regarding the lost
value of fish. Put another way, a fishing permit provides an
opportunity to catch fish, or in the case of catch shares, a
certain quantity of fish, but until possession occurs through
capture, there is no property right in that quantity of fish.
2.

There is no Property Interest in Generic Fishing Permits

When considering generic fishing permits, but not catch
shares, the courts have consistently held that these permits
are not a compensable property interest. In Conti v. United
States, the court considered whether a regulation that banned
the use and possession of gillnets for the purpose of harvesting
swordfish constituted a taking of the owner’s permit, vessel,
and fishing gear. 118 Beginning in 1985, Mr. Conti had been
commercially fishing for Atlantic swordfish using drift gillnet
gear. Shortly thereafter, NOAA Fisheries began imposing
increasingly severe restrictions on the fishery, culminating in
January 1999 with the entire prohibition of drift gillnet gear in
the Atlantic swordfish fishery. The purpose of the prohibition

114. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). The case involved a dispute of
ownership regarding a fox that Post had been pursuing, but Pierson killed. The court
found that “mere pursuit gave Post no legal right to the fox, but that he became the
property of Pierson, who intercepted and killed him.” Id. at 178.
115. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977).
116. Id.; see also Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 344 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“[T]o get title to a fish, a fisherman has to catch it before someone else does.”) (citing
Pierson, 3 Cai. at 175).
117. Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he
property right in obtaining this specific permit is, of course, distinguishable from a
claim of owning the fish themselves.”).
118. Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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was to reduce the bycatch of marine mammals and sea turtles
while conserving swordfish and other species.119 Mr. Conti filed
suit in December 1999 alleging a Fifth Amendment taking of
his property without just compensation.120
Regarding the fishing permit, the court recognized that
“courts have held that no property rights are created in
permits and licenses,” noting a line of cases involving
government grazing permits and preferences. 121 Turning to Mr.
Conti’s permit, the court determined that the fishing permit
lacked certain qualities that typically characterize property.
For example, while the permit could be utilized to fish, Mr.
Conti could not assign, sell, or otherwise transfer the permit. 122
Further, the swordfish permit did not confer exclusive fishing
privileges authorizing Mr. Conti to exclude others from the
swordfish fishery. 123 In addition, the government retained the
ability to revoke, suspend, or modify the permit at any time. 124
Finally, the court recognized that the Magnuson-Stevens Act
expressly states that the limited access permit system “shall
not create . . . any right, title, or interest in or to any fish,” and
that NOAA Fisheries could amend or terminate a permit
program without compensation to holders of any limited access
system permits. 125 Based upon these factors, the court
concluded that the fishing permit “bestowed a revocable
license, instead of a property right.” 126

119. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 4055; Conti, 291 F.3d at 1337.
120. In clarifying the nature of his taking claim, the court noted that Mr. Conti’s
permit, vessel, and gear were not physically taken from him. The permit remained
valid for other types of swordfishing, and Mr. Conti maintained possession of the
fishing vessel and gear. Conti, 291 F.3d at 1339. In short, Mr. Conti’s taking claim
asserted that the government had taken the ability to use property in a specific way.
Id. at 1340.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1341. (“[T]he rights to sell, assign, or otherwise transfer are traditional
hallmarks of property.”) (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 435–36 (1982)).
123. Id. (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994), (The “right to
exclude others is ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property.’”) (citation omitted)).
124. Id. at 1341–42 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 6235.4(a)(3) (2000)).
125. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1853(b)(3)–(4)).
126. Conti, 291 F.3d at 1342. In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized that a
contrary holding “counterintuitively would compensate a claimant for ‘the value of a
right that the Government . . . can grant or withhold as it chooses.’” Id. (citing United
States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 493 (1973)).
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In a subsequent case, American Pelagic Fishing Co. v.
United States, the court reaffirmed the holding in Conti
regarding a property interest in fishing permits. 127 In
American Pelagic, American Pelagic purchased a large, U.S.
flagged hull and converted it into the Atlantic Star, a
commercial fishing freezer trawler. 128 American Pelagic also
applied for and received the requisite fishing permits for
participation in the Atlantic mackerel and Atlantic herring
fisheries. In response to concerns about the size of the Atlantic
Star and its impacts on fish stocks, in 1997, Congress passed a
rider to an appropriations act that had the effect of revoking
the plaintiff’s existing fishing permits and banned reissuance
of the permits for a year. 129 The legislative ban was enacted
again in 1998 and made permanent in 1999. 130 The Atlantic
Star was the only existing vessel affected by the legislation. 131
After subsequent attempts to participate in other fisheries
were unprofitable, American Pelagic filed suit alleging a taking
of its fishing permits and the use of the Atlantic Star. 132
Applying Conti, the court concluded that American Pelagic
“did not and could not possess a property interest in its fishing
permits.” 133 Specifically, the court noted that there was “no
contention that American Pelagic had the authority to assign,
sell, or transfer its permits and authorization letter, nor that it
was granted exclusive privileges to fish for Atlantic mackerel
and herring in the EEZ.” 134 The court also noted that the
relevant regulations allowed NOAA Fisheries to deny or
sanction the fishing permits for any reason. 135 For these

127. 379 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
128. The resulting fishing vessel, the Atlantic Star, was 369 feet long, displaced
6900 gross tons, and had a total of 13,400 horsepower. Id. at 1367–68. By comparison,
all the other vessels in the mackerel and herring fisheries were less than 165 feet long,
displaced less than 750 gross tons, and had less than 3000 shaft horsepower. Am.
Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 36, 42 (2001).
129. Am. Pelagic, 379 F.3d at 1368.
130. Id. at 1368–69.
131. Id. at 1369.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1374. (citing Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (“[B]ecause he could not assign, sell, or transfer his swordfishing permit, because
it did not confer exclusive fishing privileges, and because the government at all times
retained the right to revoke, suspend, or modify it, [Conti] did not possess a property
interest in his permit.”)).
134. Id.
135. Id. (citing 15 C.F.R. § 904.301(a)).
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reasons, the court concluded that the present fact-pattern was
consistent with the conditions set forth in Conti; therefore,
American Pelagic did not have a property interest in its fishing
permits for purposes of the Fifth Amendment takings clause.
3.

There Is No Property Interest in the Ability to Use a Vessel
or Gear

Courts will usually find that a claimant has a property
interest in physical property sufficient to support a taking
claim. For example, in Conti, the Federal Circuit recognized
that Mr. Conti’s boats, net, and gear constitute a cognizable
property interest under the Fifth Amendment. 136 Likewise, in
another vessel-related case, the Federal Circuit concluded that
a vessel owner had various rights in its tank barges that
qualified them as property for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment. 137 The court relied on the owner’s ability to sell or
otherwise dispose of the barges, possess or transport them, and
alter them by adding physical improvements.138 Therefore, as a
general proposition, it appears to be well established that a
fishing vessel and gear will qualify as a property interest for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment taking analysis. 139
However, courts typically distinguish between a property
right in the vessel and gear and a right to use the property for
a particular purpose. In most cases, the loss of a fishing permit
does not result in a change of ownership of the vessel or gear.
Accordingly, there typically is no categorical taking, just a
restriction on certain uses of the property. While a court will
often recognize property rights in physical property, it has not
recognized a right to use that property for a particular
purpose. As the Supreme Court explained:
136. Conti, 291 F.3d at 1342–43.
137. Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (alleging
that double hull requirement of Oil Pollution Act of 1990 affected a taking of
Maritrans’ single hull tank barges).
138. Id.
139. In Arctic King Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 360 (2004), the court
considered whether the enactment of the American Fisheries Act resulted in the
taking of a fishing vessel and associated property interests. While the court concluded
that there was no property interest in the fishing permits, the court did find a property
interest in the vessel. Id. at 370–71. However, based upon the Penn Central factors,
the court held that no taking occurred. Id. at 384–86. We note that this decision predated Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, so it is unclear what precedential effect
can be attributed to Arctic King.
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[O]ur “takings” jurisprudence . . . has traditionally been
guided by the understandings of our citizens regarding
the content of, and the State’s power over, the “bundle
of rights” that they acquire when they obtain title to
property. It seems to us that the property owner
necessarily expects the uses of his property to be
restricted, from time to time, by various measures
newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its
police powers . . .140
In applying this rationale to the fisheries context, the
Federal Circuit has concluded that fishermen do not have a
cognizable property interest in the use of their vessels to fish in
the United States EEZ. 141
In Conti, the court refused to find that a regulatory taking
had occurred. Indeed, the court declined to apply the Penn
Central test to the alleged taking of Mr. Conti’s fishing vessel.
Instead, in affirming the lower court, the court stated that “Mr.
Conti’s continuing ability ‘to sell the vessel and the gear, fish
in a different fishery, or put both the nets and the vessel to
other uses,’ . . . precluded a finding that a regulatory taking
had occurred.”142 In addition, the court noted that Mr. Conti’s
claim also failed because his use of the vessel and gear was
totally “dependent upon a permit that was revocable at all
times.” 143
In American Pelagic, in reversing the Federal Court of
Claims, the court declined to find that a right to fish for
Atlantic mackerel and herring was a legally cognizable
property interest inherent in ownership of the Atlantic Star. In
doing so, the court examined “existing rules or
understandings” and “background principles” derived from
140. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
141. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
142. Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In doing so, the
court relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Andrus v. Allard, where the Court
concluded that regulations prohibiting the purchase, sale, or trade of migratory birds
and eagles, and their parts, did not constitute a taking of appellees’ Indian artifacts
that were partially made of feathers from the protected bird species. 444 U.S. 51, 54
(1979). In Andrus, the Court stated that the regulations at issue did not require the
surrender of the artifacts or impose a “physical invasion or restraint upon them.” Id. at
65. Significantly, the Court stated that “the denial of one traditional property right
does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’
of property rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking, because
the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.” Id. at 65–66.
143. Conti, 291 F.3d at 1345 n.8 (citing Mitchell Arms, Inc. v. United States, 7 F.3d
212, 217 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
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existing laws. 144 The court reviewed the Magnuson-Stevens Act
and preexisting common law to find that there is no right to
fish that would inhere in an owner’s title to a fishing vessel. 145
For example, the court found that, in the Magnuson-Stevens
Act, “Congress explicitly assumed ‘sovereign rights and
exclusive fishery management authority over all fish’ in the
EEZ” and that “Congress also erected an elaborate framework
by which the fisheries in the EEZ would be managed under the
oversight of the Secretary.” 146 Because the Magnuson-Stevens
Act was in place at the time the fishing vessel was purchased,
the court found that the statute was an “existing rule” or
“background principle” that inhered in American Pelagic’s title
to the vessel. 147 Therefore, because the ability to fish was
subject to governmental permission and not a right inherent in
the ownership of the fishing vessel, the court concluded that
the loss of the ability to use the vessel and gear to fish was not
a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment. 148
C.

Provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act May Create the
Perception of Property Rights Under Certain
Circumstances

While the courts have definitively stated that generic fishing
permits are not property under the Fifth Amendment, the
courts have not yet ruled specifically on whether catch shares
are property for takings purposes. 149 While, as described below,
144. Am. Pelagic, 379 F.3d at 1376 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030).
145. Id. at 1381.
146. Id. at 1378–79. The court also determined that the Magnuson-Stevens Act was
consistent with the preexisting common law with regard to the role played by the
sovereign in managing fisheries resources. Id. at 1379 (citing McCready v. Virginia, 94
U.S. 391, 394 (1874) (“[T]he principle has long been settled in this court, that each
State owns the beds of all tide-waters within its jurisdiction, unless they have been
granted away. In like manner, the States own the tide-waters themselves, and the fish
in them, so far as they are capable of ownership while running.”)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1381.
149. For purposes of marital dissolution, courts have held that fishing permits are
property. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 928 P.2d 597, 599–600 (Alaska 1996) (while
recognizing that IFQ does not constitute property in Fifth Amendment context, Court
held that IFQ creates a property interest subject to marital division based on value
associated with right of limited access to fishery resources). Likewise, courts have
recognized that fishing permits are property in the due process context. Foss v. Nat’l
Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1998) (In determining whether a
party had a protectable property interest in acquiring an IFQ permit for purposes of
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catch shares embody more attributes of property than fishing
permits and there are strong arguments in support of finding a
property right in catch shares, the Magnuson-Stevens Act
contains a strong disclaimer against any compensable property
rights. The Act provides that catch shares “may be revoked,
limited, or modified at any time . . . shall not confer a right of
compensation . . . shall not create . . . any right . . . or interest
in or to any fish before the fish is harvested . . . and shall be
considered a grant of permission” to participate in fishing
activities.150 Accordingly, even if catch shares are found to be
property for Fifth Amendment takings purposes, catch share
holders remain subject to the government’s ability to make
changes to the management regime and likely have no right to
compensation for any loss of share value. 151 Yet, many of the
attributes of catch shares foster the perception that share
holders possess a property right in those shares. Creating such
a perception has significant implications for management
programs.
1.

Arguments Supporting a Finding of Property Rights in
Catch Shares

Given the nature of catch shares and the administrative
attributes of any catch share management regime, there are
strong arguments in support of finding that a catch share is
property right for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. Notably,
catch shares are more closely aligned with traditional property
and can be distinguished from the fishing permits at issue in
Conti and American Pelagic. As with any other legal
determination, the particular circumstances are likely to affect
the strength of any claim that a catch share revocation should
be considered a taking.
In both Conti and American Pelagic, the courts emphasized
that the plaintiffs lacked the ability to transfer, assign, or sell
the permit at issue. In contrast, one of the hallmarks of most
procedural due process, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[t]here can be no doubt that
the IFQ permit is property”). Because the Fifth Amendment examination of due
process rights is broader than that for a takings claim, this conclusion does not
necessarily resolve the issue here. Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional
Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 (2000); Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the
Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 318 (2007).
150. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b) (Supp. V 2006).
151. Members of Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
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catch share programs is that the permits can be assigned,
leased, sold, or transferred. 152 The current Magnuson-Stevens
Act authority requires that a catch share program include a
“policy and criteria” for transferability of shares, which could
allow for liberal share assignment, sale, or transfer.153 A policy
supporting freely transferable catch shares would further
arguments that those shares are a property right. 154
The Supreme Court has recognized that “the right to exclude
is ‘perhaps the most fundamental of all property
interests.’” 155 In Conti and American Pelagic, the court
emphasized that generic fishing permits created no exclusive
fishing privilege. 156 In characterizing this lack of excludability
associated with fishing permits, the court in Members of the
Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n stated that:
[T]he number of [fishing] licenses to be issued under
such a scheme is not fixed. Each additional license
dilutes the value of the previously issued licenses. So
long as the government retains the discretion to
determine the total number of licenses issues, the
number of market entrants is indeterminate. Such a
license is by its very nature not exclusive. [T]he
fisherman . . . can[not] exclude later licensees from
entering the market, increasing competition, and
thereby diminishing the value of his license. 157
By comparison, the court found the federally issued peanut
quotas at issue in that case to be a property right as those
quotas “represented a right to plant and produce a certain
amount of peanuts at a certain price in specific crop
years.” 158 Catch shares likely occupy a middle ground between
152. For examples, see NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 10, at 103–17.
153. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(7) (Supp. V 2006).
154. Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n, 421 F.3d at 1333 (“[T]he
transferability of the quotas supports the conclusion that the quotas constitute
property.”).
155. Id. (citing Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005)).
156. The court’s consideration of exclusivity in determining whether the Conti
permit constituted a property right relied on the statement from Dolan v. Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 384 (1994) that “the right to exclude others is ‘one of the most essential sticks
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.’” Conti v. United
States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
157. Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n, 421 F.3d at 1333–34.
158. Id. at 1334. The court noted that “[t]he statutory scheme limited the number of
total pounds of quota peanuts and, in conjunction with the price supports, guaranteed
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the permits in Conti and American Pelagic and the quotas in
Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n. As defined by the
Magnuson-Stevens Act, catch shares are “held for exclusive
use.” 159 Catch shares represent a privilege, allocated to a
limited number of qualified fishermen, to harvest a percentage
of each year’s total allowable catch. 160 Catch shares, however,
are distinguishable from the peanut quotas at issue in
Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n in a few respects.
Rather than providing a fixed quantity protection annually,
catch shares provide exclusive access to the specified
proportion of the available catch. This exclusivity is critical to
maintaining catch within biological limits, as it allows total
catch to be appropriately constrained. This structure appears
to maintain the government's authority to issue additional
catch shares, which would dilute the interests of existing catch
share holders by reducing the portion of the allowable catch
that they would be allocated, in a manner similar to the
dilution of interests that would arise from the issuance of
additional fishing permits. 161 In addition, the price protections
embodied in those peanut quotas are not present in catch
shares.
So, while catch shares are more of an exclusive right and
more akin to property than the fishing permits previously
considered by the courts in the Fifth Amendment context, they
also lack some of the attributes that led to the court conclude
that peanut quotas are a property right. It may, nevertheless,
be plausible to contend that catch shares are a property right
because, as stated by the court in Members of the Peanut Quota
Holders Ass’n, “[a] property right accrues when the
government has seen fit to take a limited resource and secure
a minimum price on the peanuts. Once a particular quota had been awarded, the
granting of further quotas did not dilute that allotment . . . By awarding a quota
holder a set price on a fixed quantity of peanuts, the government established a defined
market for each quota holder—a market exclusive to that quota holder.” Id.
159. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802(23), 1802(26) (Supp. V 2006).
160. Id. § 1802(26).
161. Although no such allocation of catch shares is known to have been made, one
year after implementation of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands crab rationalization
program, Congress made an allocation of processor quota shares in that program to a
company as a part of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006. See
Pub. L. No. 109-241, § 417(a), 120 Stat 516, 545 (2006). The processor quota shares
issued in that program authorize the acceptance of deliveries of harvested crab in a
manner analogous to authorization of crab harvests under a catch share. This
processor quota share issuance had the effect of diluting the interests of existing
processing quota share holders in that program.
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it for the benefit of an individual or a predetermined group of
individuals.” 162
The auction of shares or use of a federal loan to support a
share purchase could further reinforce arguments that catch
shares are property rights. 163 Following the payment of an
auction price to the federal government, a share holder whose
shares are subject to revocation would have a reasonable
argument that the government’s acceptance of payments is an
implicit acknowledgement of their value as property and the
retention of any payment constitutes unjust enrichment. 164 The
ability to secure a federal loan to fund the purchase of shares
also supports an argument that the holder has a property
162. 421 F.3d at 1334.
163. Such an argument is advanced with respect to proposed auctions of broadcast
licenses. E.g., David Seth Zlotlow, Broadcast License Auctions and the Demise of Public
Interest Regulation, 92 CAL. L. REV. 885, 904–07 (2004) (arguing that the property
right characteristics of the broadcast licenses and the extent to which a reasonable
expectation of compensation has been created by the government have created
property rights.
164. Similar (but distinguishable) circumstances arise under federal grazing permits
and leases. Those contracts typically have a ten year term with a renewal preference
for the permit or lease holder. Leases and permits are subject to cancellation in
accordance with their terms. So cancellation can occur during the term of the lease.
Yet, payments are made annually limiting potential arguments of unjust enrichment
should a permit or lease be cancelled. In addition, leases and permits are subject to
non-renewal, if those lands remain available for grazing under land use plans. 43
U.S.C. § 315b (2006). Despite the legislative authority for ending leases and permits
(and authority for non-renewal) conservation and environmental groups have bought
grazing permits and leases to retire those privileges and, together with some ranchers,
have periodically exerted efforts to initiate a federally funded buyback of permits and
leases. These initiatives are for voluntary buyouts or buybacks under which a lease or
permit holder would receive a one-time payment intended to facilitate the retirement
or termination of the existing permit (or lease) and any preference for continuation of
the permit (or lease). Interestingly, any contention that a buyback is appropriate to
retire or terminate permits (and leases) implicitly acknowledges that these permits
(and leases) carry some long term privilege to access to the grazing lands at the
prevailing federal permit or lease rate. Similar arguments could be applied to the long
term privilege associated with catch share allocations, whether or not those allocations
require payment from their recipients. See April Reese, The Big Buyout, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 4, 2005, http://www.hcn.org/issues/295/15398; for examples of
proposed buyout legislation see Multi-Use Conflict Resolution Act of 2005, H.R. 3166,
109th Cong. (2005); Voluntary Grazing Permit Buyout Act, H.R. 3324, 108th Cong.
(2003); Arizona Voluntary Grazing Permit Buyout Act, H.R. 3337, 108th Cong. (2003).
Several similar buybacks of fishing vessels and federal fisheries permits have occurred
to address overcapacity. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-699T,
COMMERCIAL FISHERIES: EFFECTIVENESS OF FISHING BUYBACK PROGRAMS CAN BE
IMPROVED (2001) (Statement of Barry T. Hill, Director, Natural Resources and
Environment Report, before the House Subcommittee on Fisheries Conservation,
Wildlife and Oceans).
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interest in any catch shares. These loans have terms of up to
twenty-five or thirty years, suggesting that the interest being
acquired may be expected to retain value for that period. In
addition, loans are typically secured by the purchased
shares, 165 a further acknowledgement of long-term value.
On its face, limiting the duration of catch shares to a term of
no more than ten years would appear to diminish any
expectation of the permanency of catch shares and any
assertion that the revocation of the share allocation should be
compensable. Yet, the cyclical share renewal established under
the Magnuson-Stevens Act (described by NOAA Fisheries as a
“rolling conditional permanence”) could strengthen arguments
that a catch share is a property right in some cases. Under the
provision, catch shares are issued for a period of no more than
ten years, but are renewed unless those shares are revoked,
limited, or modified. 166 The FMP establishing the catch share
program may identify the reasons for a revocation, limitation,
or modification. For example, a catch share program could
condition share renewal on the acquisition and use of costly
gear and adoption of costly fishing practices. Such a structure
may lead to an expectation in the share holder that, not only
will the share not be revoked or modified during the defined
term, but that the shares will also be reissued at the end of its
term, if the share holder satisfies the conditions of the plan. A
share holder who expends the resources and efforts to satisfy
the conditions could argue that the expenditures were made to
ensure the continuation of the fishing privilege for an
additional period. 167
Although Congress declined to revisit its statement that
catch shares are not compensable property rights when it
reauthorized the Magnuson-Stevens Act, it expressly
authorized the creation of catch share programs that embody
more attributes of property than previous fishing permits.
Notably, the hallmarks of many catch share programs are their

165. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 253.28(g) (2011) (shares primary collateral for loan).
166. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(f)(1) (Supp. V 2006).
167. Revocation of catch shares subject to this “conditional permanence” may be
distinguishable from revocation of the impermanent quotas in Members of the Peanut
Quota Holders Ass’n v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The peanut
quotas under that program were revoked prior to a sunset of the program. Id. at 1335.
Yet, those peanut quotas were not subject to any renewal provision (particularly a
renewal provision intended to induce the holder to adopt certain practices in the use of
those quotas, as might be created under a catch share program). Id.
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exclusivity and transferability, two of the attributes of
property found lacking in the fishing permits in Conti and
American Pelagic. In addition, potential auction payments or
federal loans further the share holder’s expectation of a
property interest in those catch shares. Accordingly, it is
possible that, depending upon the structure of the catch share
program at issue, a court could find that catch shares are
property for purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s takings
analysis.
2. Even if Considered Property, Catch Shares are Unlikely to
Create a Right to Compensation from the Government.
Unfortunately for the catch share holder, even if catch
shares are considered property, this conclusion is not
determinative regarding the availability of compensation for
any taken shares. The second Penn Central factor, which
considers the reasonableness of the expectations of the
property holder, seems most relevant to any determination of
whether revocation of catch shares would constitute a
compensable taking. Any issued catch shares are subject to
Congress’s statement that catch shares “shall not confer any
right
of
compensation . . . if . . . revoked,
limited,
or
modified.”168 This statement should diminish any expectations
concerning the government’s authority to revoke catch shares
without compensation.
Although the Magnuson-Stevens Act disclaimer creates a
substantial hurdle for a person asserting a takings claim, the
Court has suggested that such a disclaimer alone may not be
determinative. In Palazzalo v. Rhode Island, the Supreme
Court held that a purchaser of land who took title after the
adoption of wetlands regulations could challenge those
regulations as enacting a taking. 169 The Court specifically

168. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b) (Supp. V 2006). In both Conti and American Pelagic, the
Federal Circuit relied, in part, on the ability to “suspend, revoke, or modify” to
conclude that the permits at issue bestowed “a revocable license, instead of a property
right.” Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1341–2 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Am. Pelagic
Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In an analogous
situation, involving the revocation of a grazing permit issued under the Taylor Grazing
Act, the Supreme Court found that similar language in the statute expressed the clear
Congressional intent that no compensable property interest was created by the permit.
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973).
169. 533 U.S. 606, 627–28 (2001).
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stated that “a blanket rule that purchasers with notice have no
compensation right when a claim becomes ripe is too blunt an
instrument to accord with the duty to compensate for what is
taken.” 170 In the case of catch shares, however, it seems
unlikely that the creation of expectations of a secure property
right could rise to the level of creating a right to compensation
due to the strength of the Magnuson Stevens Act disclaimer.171
The conclusion that catch shares carry no right to
compensation on their revocation is also supported by the
statement of the Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n
court that:
[t]he government is free to create programs that convey
benefits in the form of property, but, unless the statute
itself or surrounding circumstances indicate that such
conveyances are intended to be irrevocable, the
government does not forfeit its right to withdraw those
benefits or qualify them as it chooses. 172
In denying compensation for the owners of peanut quotas,
the court stated that “the property interest represented by the
peanut quota is entirely the product of a government program
unilaterally extending benefits to the quota holders, and
nothing in the terms of the statute indicated that the benefits
could not be altered or extinguished at the government’s
election.” 173 Accordingly, unless there is a clear intention that
catch shares are irrevocable, based upon the MagnusonStevens Act disclaimer, a share holder likely has no right to
170. Id at 628.
171. For example, in Kaiser v. U.S., the Court found a right to compensation
resulted from the government’s creation of public access to a navigable waterway. 444
U.S. 164 (1979). The plaintiff dredged the waterway across its land to a pond enclosed
on the plaintiff’s property. Id. at 167. The Court found the consent of government
officials to the dredging persuasive in finding for the plaintiff, stating that:
While the consent of individuals officials representing the United States cannot
estop the United States (citations omitted), it can lead to the fruition of a number
of expectancies embodied in the concept of ‘property’—expectancies that, if
sufficiently important, the Government must condemn and pay for before it takes
over the management of the land owner’s property.
Id. at 179. However, the Court in Kaiser also suggested that had the government
conditioned its approval of dredging on petitioners’ agreement to comply with various
measures that it deemed appropriate for the promotion of navigation, it may have
found no compensable property interest. Id. at 178. The disclaimer of creating a
compensable interest in the Magnuson-Stevens Act would seem to serve to overcome
any expectations of a compensable property interest that might be created by the
various property-like characteristics of catch shares.
172. 421 F.3d at 1335.
173. Id. at 1334.
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compensation for any lost share value and associated
investment in vessels and gear resulting from a revocation or
modification of the applicable fishery management regime.
IV. POLICYMAKERS SHOULD REFER TO THE JUDICIAL
TAKINGS ANALYSIS WHEN IMPLEMENTING OR
AMENDING CATCH SHARE PROGRAMS
Although it may be unlikely that a court would find that a
catch share is a compensable property right, the structure of
catch share programs may create an expectation in share
holders that catch shares are property that have some measure
of permanence. Some share holders have secured loans and
made significant monetary investments to acquire catch shares
and purchase the necessary vessels and gear to harvest the
associated allocation of fish. Arguably, a share holder’s
inability to recover this lost investment following the
government’s modification or revocation of the catch share
program would be inequitable. In fact, a catch share program’s
benefits are derived from inducing share holders to behave as
if catch shares are a property right; while the government
retains the authority to revoke those shares, based on the
disclaimer that the shares are not property. If that expectation
can be effectively moderated, without deterring the desired
behavior, the potential inequity may be avoided. While, as
discussed above, the ability of a share holder to recover lost
investment through a Fifth Amendment taking claim is
tenuous, the share holder’s predicament could be addressed
through the applicable Council when developing, amending, or
revoking a catch share program. Accordingly, fishery managers
may benefit from consideration of the following principles, as
informed by the Penn Central factors, when contemplating a
transition between different management structures.
A.

Penn Central Factors Applied to Specific Fisheries
Management Decisions

When applying the Penn Central factors, a court undertakes
a fact-based examination of the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant, the extent to which the regulation
interferes with an investment backed expectation, and the
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character of the government action. 174 By considering the Penn
Central factors, policymakers could design catch share
programs and successor management structures that ease the
transition between the different management regimes by
moderating expectations of participants in the fishery.
Specifically, measures that reduce the potential for a takings
finding are also likely to mitigate the disruption to fishery
operations due to any transition between alternative
management regimes. 175
The first Penn Central factor considers the economic impact
of the regulatory change. Annual changes in allocations arising
from changes in allowable catches are anticipated from the
structure of catch share programs. In addition, periodic
amendments intended to fine tune the programs to achieve an
intended result are commonplace and should be anticipated. 176
While somewhat disruptive to catch share holders, these
changes generally cannot be characterized as “functionally
equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly
appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his
domain,” 177 as would be needed to support a takings claim.
Only larger changes, such as catch share revocations or
abandonment of a catch share program, are likely to have the
substantial economic effect on participants that characterizes
compensable takings.
The economic impact of transitioning from a catch share
program to another form of management would depend upon
the catch share program, the subsequent management regime
of the fishery, and how that new management dovetails with
the catch share structure. If catch share holders are left
without a fishing opportunity under the new management
regime, the economic impact will be significant. For example,
consider a Council that wishes to transition from a catch share
174. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1973).
175. It should also be noted that the inverse is likely also true, in that measures
that tend toward a taking increase the disruption to fishery participants. Participants
who are likely to gain from a catch share program might therefore advocate for
program elements that strengthen property rights and argue for a finding of a taking
to increase the security of their gains under the program. Even if these stakeholders
are unlikely to persuade a court that a program modification that revokes their shares
is a taking, policymakers supporting the modification will have to face stronger equity
arguments in opposition to the change.
176. Mark Fina, Evolution of Catch Share Management: Lessons from Catch Share
Management in the North Pacific, 36 FISHERIES 164–77 (2010).
177. Penn Central, 544 U.S. at 539.
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program back to a limited entry program. If the catch share
program permitted shares to be divisible on transfer, the
fishery may have far more catch share holders than could be
reasonably accommodated by a limited entry program. Such a
limited entry program would require a very abbreviated
fishing season that would pose problems to both managers
attempting to manage to the allowable catch and participants
attempting to realize a reasonable return from the fishery. 178
One obvious way to address this problem would be to grant
fishing privileges (or limited entry permits) only to persons
who hold over a threshold amount of catch shares. This,
however, would exclude persons who hold under the threshold
number of shares. These excluded share holders may have less
at stake in the fishery than holders of large numbers of shares,
but they also may have fewer resources and fishing
opportunities. Consequently, the economic impact of being
excluded from the successor management regime to these
small entities could be relatively large, in comparison to the
impact on a larger entity.
Other catch share structures may avoid this complication.
Some catch share programs are structured around a vessel
licensing program (such as license limitation). Under a limited
license program, participation is limited to holders of licenses
that qualify for the fishery. Under an associated catch share
program, these licenses continue to authorize participation,
with each license holder receiving an allocation of catch shares
(based on catch history or other factors). In effect, the longterm catch shares are appurtenances of the license that can be
transferred only by transferring the license. Three of the catch
share programs in the North Pacific use such a structure,
under which each catch share allocation is both appurtenant to
and inseverable from a license or vessel. 179 These structures
178. For example, the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands crab rationalization program
was, in large part, adopted to address overcapacity. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Final
Bering Sea Aleutian Islands Crab Fisheries Environmental Impact Statement, ES-2
(2004). In each of the nine fisheries subject to that program, the current number of
catch shares holders exceeds the number of vessels that participated in the fishery
prior to the program, when overcapacity was perceived as a problem. NAT’L MARINE
FISHERIES SERV., BERING SEA AND ALEUTIAN ISLANDS CRAB RATIONALIZATION REPORT:
FISHING
YEAR
2010/11,
at
21–22
(2011),
available
at
http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/ram/crab/1011crabrpt.pdf.
179. See 50 C.F.R. § 679.20 (2012) (describing the Bering Sea pollock fishery, under
which catch share allocations to cooperatives are based on vessel ownership and catch
histories of qualified vessels). Recent legislation allows for limited transfer of catch
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provide a readily identifiable means for establishing fishery
qualification, if managers should elect to end the applicable
catch share program. If the catch share program is abandoned
while retaining the vessel or licensing program, it is possible
that any negative economic effects could be mitigated, since all
catch share program participants would be provided an equal
opportunity to participate in the fishery under the subsequent
management regime. 180 Catch share programs can mitigate
economic impacts of changes by adopting structures that
accommodate those changes, including the possible transition
to other management structures without the need to exclude
any share holders.
The second Penn Central factor, whether the government
action interferes with an investment-backed expectation, is
also likely to be affected by both the structure of the catch
share program (and the catch share allocations defined by it)
and the succeeding fishing privileges or management regime.
For example, catch share holders who acquire shares at some
cost would likely have an investment-backed expectation in the
continuation of their catch share interest for some indefinite
term. Persons who borrowed under a government loan are
likely to have an expectation that their catch shares (and the
accompanying annual allocations) will remain largely intact
through the life of their loan. Whether the successor
management regime allows that person to continue fishing
would determine the extent to which the regulation interferes
with the holder’s investment-backed expectation.
A program with severable and divisible catch share
allocations could have many holders of small numbers of

histories among qualified vessels; however, allocations are only available to qualified
vessels. H.R. 3619, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted); see 50 C.F.R. § 679.90 (2011)
(describing catch share allocations to cooperatives based on vessel ownership (or
limited entry license holdings, in the event a vessel is lost) and catch histories of
qualified vessel); 50 C.F.R. § 679.80 (2009) (describing the Central Gulf of Alaska
rockfish program under which allocations are based on license holdings and catch
histories of vessels using qualified licenses). Under each of these programs, long term
catch share privileges (as distinguished from annual allocations) cannot be severed
from the associated vessel or license, as applicable.
180. Some proponents of catch shares, however, advocate for the severability of
share holdings as a means of achieving consolidation accompanying economic
efficiencies. These commenters would likely argue that non-severability of long term
share holdings (which would necessarily arise from a program that attaches the catch
share allocation to a license or vessel) would prevent the program from fully achieving
its potential economic benefits. E.g., Hannesson, supra note 21, at 37; NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 167–68.
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shares. Transition to another management regime could be
complicated should NOAA Fisheries attempt to ensure that
each of these persons is able to continue participating in the
fishery. A threshold share holding could be required to
continue participation under the successor management
regime. Using this structure it may be possible to develop a
system that allows holders of few shares to consolidate their
holdings with others to meet the threshold to allow continued
participation. These share holders therefore have two choices.
They can either stay in the fishery by acquiring more shares or
receive compensation for their shares on exiting the fishery by
transferring their shares to another person who is
consolidating shares to continue in the fishery. Such a system
would need to equitably balance the interests of those who hold
few shares with those who hold many shares. A catch share
program that retains a vessel or licensing component could
overcome this problem by effectively limiting participation in a
subsequent management regime to a specific number of share
holders that the fishery might reasonably accommodate.
Programs that maintain vestiges of prior limited entry
management regimes could streamline transition from catch
share management to another management structure. 181
Catch share terms could also be used to moderate
expectations of share holders. Arguably, the current
Magnuson-Stevens Act, which limits share terms to ten years,
has this moderating effect. However, in practice, the automatic
renewal of any allocations that are not revoked, modified, or
limited during their term may have the opposite effect;
reinforcing expectations that catch share allocations are
permanent, particularly if the conditions on renewal require
the share holder to meet some performance standard. An
alternative approach could be to establish fixed terms for
shares; however, limiting the allocation to a fixed term begs
the question of what management measures will govern the
fishery and what fishing permits will be issued at the
expiration of the term. Catch shares are viewed as successful
for fishery management because they allow their holders to
plan their harvest operations. Fixed terms allow for planning
during the term, but could create great uncertainty at the

181. These structures, however, may be disfavored some commentators, as they do
not allow for efficiencies that would arise from restructuring long term holdings.
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expiration of the term, unless steps are taken to provide
fishery participants with notice of the transition.
Under the third Penn Central factor, a court considers the
character of the government action. Specifically, courts
consider whether the action balances benefits and burdens of
economic life for the common good or if the interference is so
substantial that it should appropriately be borne by the public
as a whole. Again, a policymaker should take this factor into
consideration when contemplating the nature of the catch
share program and the subsequent fishery management
regime. For example, management measures that are
undertaken to improve biological management of the fishery
and are adopted to address environmental harms arising from
fishing practices, while likely to support the common good,
might appropriately be borne by participants in the fisheries
who directly cause those harms. On the other hand, a
reallocation of interests in the fishery intended solely for
distributional effects among different classes of users could be
argued to be such a direct interference with the share holder’s
interest strictly for the benefit of others that it is a burden that
should be borne by the public in general.
For example, abandonment of a catch share program or
redistribution of shares simply to benefit residents of certain
economically disadvantaged communities to the detriment of
catch share holders, who are thereafter excluded from the
fishery, could be unfair to catch share holders who are not
permitted to participate in the subsequent fishery. 182 These
catch share holders could reasonably argue that their losses
are more appropriately borne by the public as a whole. A
Council could address this shortcoming by establishing a
transition or a less severe reallocation that accommodates
some interests of the existing catch share holders.
As should be apparent, the Penn Central factors could guide
policymakers attempting to ease transitions with changes in
management (including changes between catch share
programs and other forms of management). Specifically, the
factors provide a framework for balancing an individual’s
interests against the broader public interests at issue in a
182. Other program provisions could make renewal of shares contingent on
maintaining a certain landing pattern to benefit fishing communities. In such a case,
the disregard of share holder performance when determining fishing privileges in a
new management regime could be argued to forsake an important interest that was
important under the prior management.
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fishery management program. Despite the likelihood that
catch shares do not create compensable property rights,
takings law provides a useful framework for considering the
appropriateness of management actions that create or change
catch share programs. Councils and NOAA Fisheries should
consider the magnitude of impacts, the degree to which actions
interfere with reasonable expectations of affected share
holders, and the character of the actions (or the appropriate
distribution of the burden between catch share holders and the
public).
V.

CONCLUSION

The consideration and establishment of catch share
programs have generated substantial controversy over the
years. While much of this focus has been on the perception that
catch share programs establish property rights in fishery
resources, policymakers have given relatively little
consideration to the legal nature of the catch shares
themselves and the associated implications for share holders.
Although catch shares are generally referred to as property
rights, this characterization is likely inaccurate. However,
depending upon how a Council or NOAA Fisheries establishes
a specific catch share program, a share holder could have
substantially stronger arguments that allocated catch shares
should be treated as property for purposes of compensation
pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.
For example, if NOAA Fisheries auctions shares, issues
loans to facilitate the purchase of shares, or establishes specific
performance criteria to support a mandatory share renewal
process, the holder of those shares would have a much stronger
claim of entitlement compared to traditional fishing permits.
Nevertheless, courts are unlikely to award compensation for
revocation of catch shares. Further, policymakers who consider
the elements of a takings analysis under the Fifth Amendment
may be better equipped to create, revise, and terminate catch
share management programs in a way that achieves their
management goals while decreasing the likelihood that a
takings claim could arise in the future.
To some degree, the tension arising from catch share
management stems from the contradiction between the public
trust doctrine, which dictates that natural resources should be
held by the government for the public benefit, and the attempt
to attain these same goals through a property rights-like
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regime. To achieve the intended policy goals, catch share
proponents advocate that catch shares should be imbued with
the characteristics of property (such as exclusivity and
transferability). Yet, the public trust nature of fishery
resources is clearly maintained by the Magnuson-Stevens Act
disclaimer that catch shares are subject to modification or
revocation without compensation. As a result of this
contradiction, catch share programs are developed to induce
share holders to behave as if they hold a compensable property
interest in those shares (both through their investment
practices and through their defense of those interests before
policymakers), while retaining policymakers’ authority to
revoke those shares without compensation. The result is
uncertainty in both catch share holders and the public
concerning the exact nature of the interest embodied in catch
shares. To date, policymakers have not articulated a clear
standard for this most critical aspect of catch share
management; instead they have proceeded to attempt to
balance the competing interests of catch share holders and the
public through amendments to those programs. This issue will
remain unsettled until a definitive reconciliation of these
contradictions is presented by policymakers. In the meantime,
the overarching policy considerations used in property rights
cases, such as those embodied in the Penn Central test, may
provide a tractable guide to policymakers, share holders, and
other stakeholders attempting to address the contradiction
while treating all stakeholders equitably and maintaining
fisheries management for the common good.
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